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We should have a rule. Reason is available but
can be bent in any direction.
And so there is no rule.'
Blaise Pascal
The current industry among law and religion scholars to produce guidelines concerning the imposition of values in both law and politics from overt
religious traditions is, I think, timely and significant. The influence of theistic
perspectives in the public lives of Americans has apparently become a sub-
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Prances Lewis Law Center, Washington & Lee University. for supporting this research.
1. BLAISU PASCAL, Ps3NsS 216 (A.J. Krailsheimer trins., 1966).
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ject of renewed interest in the social sciences.2 Recent studies consider the
manner in which theists view and vote on issues concerning economic justice3 as well as the political power of the "religious right." In legal scholarship, arguments flourish over the propriety of reliance on religious morality
by citizens in public political dialogue or in voting, and by legislators or
judges in their official capacities. Some find such reliance generally improper
in all four situations.5 Others draw a line at voting or perhaps lobbying,6 or
between citizens and officials." And some identify instances in each of the
four situations where such reliance is proper while acknowledging that such
reliance is not always proper."
Unfortunately, the debate concerning religious influences in law and
politics can be confusing due to the ambiguity of its terms. Does religion

2. See Ellen K. Coughlin, Social Scientists Again Turn Attention to Religion's Place in the World,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUc., Apr. 1992, at A6.
3. See, e.g., STEPHEN HART, WHAT DOES THE LORD REQUIRE?: How AMERICAN CHRISTIANS THNK
ABouT ECONOMIC JUSTICE (1992).
4. See generally James L. Guth, Secular Scholars and the Religious Right, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
Apr. 7, 1993, at B3.
5. See, e.g., Edward F. Foley, Tillich and Camus, Talking Politics, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 954 (1992);
see also William P. Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44 HASTINGS L REV. 843 (1993).
6. See, e.g., Samuel W. Calhoun, Conviction Without Imposition: A Response to Professor
that Christians should not impose their beGreenawalt, 9 J.L. & REL. 289, 322 (1992). Calhoun asserts
liefs, except on "secular" grounds, in law and politics, but involvement by personal example, individual
counsel to friends, teaching, or evangelism is appropriate. Kent Greenawalt's own analysis is complicated-with respect to difficult issues where secular reasoning is inconclusive, Greenawalt would permit voting citizens as well as legislators and judges in their official decisions to rely on religious convictions, but
as to political discourse and advocacy, citizens and officials alike should use "the nonreligious language of
shared premises and modes of reasoning." Id; see Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political
Choice: Some Further Thoughts, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1019, 1022 (1990).
7. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Justice, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1083, 1090 (1990). Public
institutions should "make and justify decisions on the basis of public reasons," but such a principle "does
not forbid political advocacy on religious grounds by churches, by individuals, or by political candidates."
8. See Greenawalt, supra note 6. 1 appreciate, and will tryto maintain, Kent Greenawalt's tentative
distinction between the question of whether religious understanding is a proper basis for political choice
and dialogue, and other (yet "linked") questions in the "Church and State" field concerning the
government's (i) relation to religious organizations, (ii) support of religious positions and practices, (iii)
aid to religious promotions of the common good. (iv) restrictions on religious worship and expression, and
(v) exemptions from regulations for those with religious objections. lidat 1019. My focus in this article is
on the first question, the propriety of religious understandings in law and politics. Even so, if the term
"religious understanding" includes not only belief in the authority of a direct commandment in a sacred
text, but also various interpretations of the commandment's meaning, various notions as to the
commandment's authority, various degrees of historical and cultural influence of the commandment, and
most important for the present article, a belief in pluralism based on the sacred text, any simple picture of
religious impositions on separate, "secular" politics fades. When Greenawalt designates a sector of political dialogue where religious grounds are indistinguishable from other grounds in the degree to which they
are "rational" or "publicly accessible," id. at 126, he is challenging the presumption of a determinative
neutral or secular discourse; this tends to broaden Greenawalt's (and my own) focus beyond the issue of
religion in political dialogue to a fundamental question that recurs throughout law and religion scholarship.
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include the residue of religious traditions in culture, such as a moral philosophy that is based distantly on religious belief, or is it limited to churches and
scriptures? Does influence refer to an indirect and partial influence of religion in the life of a public official, or does it refer to legal or political decisions based on church or scriptural authority? Just as important, do judicial
and legislative decisions typically reflect a rationality that is distinct from
religious belief, or do the processes we consider rational always involve
beliefs that function like religious beliefs? The images one associates with
religion, and the vision of law and politics one maintains, have everything to
do with one's position in the debate.
In this brief article, I neither attempt to summarize the numerous and
varied proposals concerning the appropriate role of religious convictions in
law and politics, nor do I propose which role is appropriate. Such a proposal
would require surveying the various ways that different aspects of religious
belief might be involved in the different contexts of public political discourse, lobbying, law-making, judicial decision-making, and judicial review
of legislation. Rather, I introduce one version of religious political activism,
and then select a few examples from recent law and religion scholarship that
hold religious values suspect. My intention is to highlight a problem in current forms of discourse, that is, in the manner in which religious perspectives
are often discussed.9 My first example is Lawrence Solum's liberal (and
Rawlsian) theory of justice, which would require public officials to justify
their decisions on the basis of public reasons. That is, those reasons that are
justified by an "overlapping consensus" (between various religious or philosophical conceptions of the public good) concerning the ideal of public reason. In those cases where such consensus does not produce principles that
the public could "reasonably accept," the notion of individual liberty functions as a limit on moral impositions.'" My second example is Samuel

9. I am assuming, of course, that the specific manner in which we discuss law and religion is significanL Indeed, I take issue in this article with several scholars not because I necessarily disagree with how
they evaluate their own examples of reliance upon religion in law and politics, but because of how religion is described and discussed. I justify my obsession with their terminology on the basis of Mary Ann
Glendon's warning that legal "discourse has not only become the single most important tributary to political discourse, but has crept into the languages that Americans employ around the kitchen table, in the
neighborhood, and in their diverse communities of memory and mutual aid." MARY ANN GLENDON,
RIGHTs TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF PoLrmcAL DISCOURSE 3 (1991). If that discourse becomes too
absolute in ways that distort and mislead-as Glendon argues it has with respect to "rights talk"--4hen it
"promotes unrealistic expectations, heightens social conflict, and inhibits dialogue that might lead toward
consensus, accommodation, or at least the discovery of common ground." Id. at 14.
10. See Solum, supra note 7 (the alleged consensus is not on the public reasons themselves, but on
the core criteria for acceptable reasoning); see also Solum, Constructing an Ideal of Public Reason, 30

SAN DIEGo L. REv. 729 (1994), where Solum continues to develop and clarify the implications of Rawls'
views for legal theory, especially as such views appear in POLrncAL LIBERALISM (1993). For critical
assessment of that work, see Gary C. Leedes, Rawls' Excessively Secular Political Conception (review

essay), 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 1083 (1993); William Powers, Jr., Constructing Liberal Political Thinking, 72
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Calhoun's non-imposition principle, an argument that Christians should not
rely upon religious convictions in deciding to support or vote against a law;
rather, Christians should rely on independent, secular grounds." My third
example is Allan Ides' recent commentary on Bowers v. Hardwick, wherein
he challenges the sufficiency of an appeal to morality in lawmaking; legal
impositions must be rational, that is, based on reasons rather than faith." I
selected these three examples because of their variation: Solum focuses on
religious influences on judges; Calhoun's focus is on political discourse (the
"public square" in contemporary parlance); and Ides discusses morality in
legislation, including judicial review of moral legislation. Moreover, while
Solum proposes a fairly comprehensive liberal theory of religious influence
in a pluralistic state, Calhoun limits his audience to confessing Christians,
and Ides makes his remarks in passing in an article which is not focused on
the current debates in law and religion. Amid such diversity, however, I hope
to identify a form of discourse that is misleading. 3
My primary concern is that the example or instance of religious theories
of law and government, especially theories based on notions of pluralism and

TEx. L. REv. 443 (1993) (book review). With respect to Rawls' A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) and the
two decades of critical attention it inspired, see CHANDRAN KUKATHAS & PHILIP PEITr, RAWLS: A THEORY OF JUSTICE AND ITS CRMCS (1990), which is a defense of Rawls; and GEORGIA WARNKE, JUSTnCE
AND INTERPRErATION (1993), which is less generous. My own critique of Solum parallels in many respects the communitarian critique of Rawls described in KUKATHAS & PETIT, supra, at 92-118 (which critique includes Michael Sandell, LIBERALISM AND ITS LIms (1982)), and the hermeneutic critique of
WARNKE, supra, at 37-61.
11. See Calhoun, supra note 6.
12. See Allan Ides, Bowers v. Hardwick: The Enigmatic Fifth Vote and the Reasonableness of Moral
Certitude, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 93 (1992).
13. Even if our legal discourse were not so significant around kitchen tables, see supra note 9,
Glendon's warning about inhibiting dialogue would seem to apply within the bounds of legal scholarship.
On close reading of the tempests between Michael Perry (or Greenawalt) and his critics, a great deal of
consensus and common ground is hidden by analyses of unrealistic examples of religious reasoning-for
example, "The sacred text says x, so x should be law." See, e.g., Foley, supra note 5, at 957-59 (confirming, in his critique of Perry, a serious constitutional problem when God's divine commandment is invoked
as the basis of a law, though Perry would agree); see also Greenawalt, supra note 6, at 1020-36, where
Greenawalt qualifies his views in RELIGIOUS CoNVIcrIONS AND POITICAL CHOICE (1988), in response to
his critics. In my experience, most religious legal scholars and religious activists are not theonomists (and
even theonomic reconstructionists are selective in their efforts to legislate Old Testament directives). See
James W. Skillen's study of today's various Christian political voices, JAMES W. SKniEN, THE SCATTERED VOICE: CHRISTIANS AT ODDS IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE (1990); regarding theonomists, see SKILEN
supra, at 172 (government is "narrowly a criminal-law-enforcing authority"). In addition to the polarizing
effects of a discourse that hides consensus and common ground, the failure to mention the ideals of shared
forms of reasoning and of pluralism and freedom held by those who would allow religious values in law
and politics distorts our vision of religion itself. Thus Stephen Carter, in his analysis of the misunderstandings concerning religion that lead to an idealized image of the separation of church and self, concludes
that such a separation is neither required by the separation of church and state doctrine nor by "'the ideal
of pluralist democracy.' Possibly the leading theorists of liberalism do not even intend one. But they too
often write as though they do, and the courts do the same." Stephen L. Carter, The Separation of Church
and Self, 46 SMU L. REv. 585, 600 (1992).
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liberty, is often overlooked in law and religion debates. 4 Because my
phraseology in the previous sentence may sound unfamiliar or ambiguous, I
offer an example--or a counter-example to the examples of religious influence used by the scholars whose views I address in this article--of a Christian theory of pluralism. Significantly, my example is not the only Christian
conception of the state, and I do not discuss similar and dissimilar conceptions of the state based on other religious traditions. One example, however,
will serve to problematize several tendencies in the discourse of law and
religion scholarship.
First, a tendency persists among those scholars who are suspicious of
religion in law and politics to link terms like reason (or "public reason"),
freedom, neutrality, and pluralism, and then to oppose them to another set of
terms like faith (or "private faith"), morality, and imposition. Unless such
distinctions are highly qualified, such as by acknowledging the rational aspects of moral and religious discourse, or the interpretational instability of
terms like "freedom," they operate to oversimplify the issues involved in the
debate over religion in law and politics. For example, a Christian theory of
the state may include the ideals of freedom and pluralism not as an appeal to
"secular" grounds, but as elements of the theory itself.5
Second, the standard example of religious influence or "faith-based reasoning" in law and politics is the Christian's appeal to a Biblical passage as
support for a law. This tendency might appear justifiable because a majority
of the public may "believe that government may endorse a preferred religious
belief,' 6 but the model of turning scripture verses into law is not the model
14. Significantly, Solum, supra note 7, at 1090 n.27, identifies "religious arguments for toleration" as
potentially beneficial in forning "an overlapping consensus on a political conception of justice." A legislator or judge, however, should (in Solum's view) appeal not to the religious argument to justify a decision,
but to the overlapping consensus between various religious and secular perspectives.
15. To distinguish the sides in the debate over religion in law and politics on the basis of pluralists
versus non-pluralists, or those who believe in freedom and open dialogue versus those who want to limit
dialogue by imposing their morality and religious terminology on everyone, is perhaps convenient but is
wrong. If the critic of religion in law and politics points out that it is precisely the religious proponent's
vision of pluralism and freedom that bothers her (because religion in that vision would get more play),
then the critic has seen my point and, I hope, will stop talking (if she had been) as though this is a debate
between those who respect pluralism and freedom and those who do not. The debate is actually about
what those words mean-both sides claim to desire and to understand genuine pluralism and freedom.
J.M. Balkin reminds us that our definitions of abstract theoretical ideas, like equality and freedom, help us
understand the legal and social world and (are used] to persuade each other about what
should be done in that world.... [They frame] the terms of political debate and political
thought....
... If racial equality is successfully defined as formal equality ....
this affects the
way we think about issues of racial justice... and frames the sort of arguments that can be
plausibly offered about these issues.
J.M. Balkin, Ideological Drift and the Struggle Over Meaning, 25 CONN. L REV. 869, 876 (1993). One
concern in this article is with a discursive framework wherein religious perspectives are too often contrastad with the ideals of freedom and pluralism.
16. See Douglas Laycock, Fornal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39
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for political activism in the version of Christian pluralism I introduce nor, I
suspect, in many other religious conceptions of the state. Any account of
religion as improper in law and politics is insufficient if it rests on, or only
"works" by reference to, the model of legislating scripture.
Finally, I identify a tendency to assume the existence of a standard by
which one can evaluate religious or moral influences on law and politics that
is beyond religion and morality. The scholars whose work I address acknowledge the existence of historical religious and moral foundations in law.
But their various appeals to conventions (for Solum, the here-and-now, the
fact of our political culture), to secular forms of reasoning (Calhoun), and to
experience (Ides) purport to establish grounds for laws that are
epistemologically distinct from all forms of religious morality. Here, my
example of Christian pluralism is not merely a counter-example to the tendencies (i) to oppose religion to pluralism, and (ii) to assume that the model
of religious influence is to legislate scripture. It is instead a counter-theory
that challenges our ability to avoid reliance on foundational beliefs in the
processes and institutions of law. That is, even our notions of pluralism and
liberty, by which we judge the propriety of religious influences in law, are
contestable.
This is not to deny the effectiveness in law of an "overlapping consensus" (per Solum), the advantages of Christian self-restraint with respect to
Biblical morality (per Calhoun), or the helpfulness of a distinction between
reasonable and unreasonable laws based on experience (per Ides). Each of
these phenomena tends to make the theory on which each is based more
attractive, but the theories remain matters of faith-like commitment. Moreover, the assertion that theories about the place of religion in law are matters
of commitment need not imply a complete collapse of faith and reason or of
religion and politics.1" The category of "religion," in its various aspects, can

DEPAUL L. REV. 993. 1012, citing HERBERT MCCLOSKEY & AuDA BRu., THE DImENSIONs OF TOLERANCE: WHAT AMu ANS THINK ABoUr CIVIL LIBERTIES 133 (1983). However, those on the right who

argue for moral reform often do not consider legal and political realities: "Generalized moralism, in other
words, often becomes focused on political action even when many of the changes envisioned cannot be
accomplished through government's powers and even when (such] a group's ideology might oppose big or

intrusive government. What is operative is an undifferentiated and sometimes nationalistic moral concern."
SKiLEN, supra note 13, at 39.
17. I refer here to the "strong" position that no genuine distinctions exist between reason and faith
(because all reasoning proceeds from faith-based presuppositions), between the secular and the religious
(because the faith-based presuppositions of "secular" discourse are so similar to religious commitments),
or between neutrality in law and legal impositions of morality (because law is the imposition of morality).
That strong position finds support in the work associated with Critical Legal Studies that is directed at disclosing ideological belief-structures in mainstream legal theory and practice, some of which also suggests
that a form of religious understanding is inevitable in law and politics. See generally David S. Caudill,
Disclosing Tilt: A Partial Defense of Critical Legal Studies and an Introduction to the Philosophy of the
Law-Idea, 72 IOWA L.REv. 287 (1987). Moreover, much that is termed the postmodem approach in the
law-related disciplines of historiography and literary theory is an attack upon rationalist notions of dis-
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include all kinds of beliefs, knowledge, practices, and institutions that are
distinct from other cultural phenomena such as our shared modes of cognition and communication. 8 On the other hand, a theory of pluralism that is

course, knowledge, and the (human) subject Such an attack implies that law, as a historical phenomenon
and a textual practice, is a matter of social structures and relations of power. See, e.g., Frederick Mark
Gedicks, The Religious, the Secular, and the Antithetical, 20 CAP. U. L REv. 113 (1991) (employing a
postmodern critique--and relying as well on Unger's critical-legal approach-of neutrality to question the
notion of secular or neutral discourse concerning church/state relations). The attack also implies that law is
a type of "civil" religious institution. The analogy between law and religion is developed differently in
Sanford Levinson's CONSTTUrIONAL FArrm (1988) and Peter Goodrich's LANGUAGES OF LAw: FROM
LOGICS OF MEMORY TO NOMADIC MASKS (1990). which analogy indicates the problem with the question
of the propriety of "religious understanding" in law-making and in judicial decisions. Finally, the strong
position is alive and well in the debates in the field of moral philosophy between those who believe in
moral reason and those who view morals as personal choices. See, e.g., Jonathan Bennett, The Necessity of
Moral Judgments, 103 Ehircs 458 (1993) (non-realist Bennett's critique of moral realist Judith
Thompson's, THE REALM OF RIGHTS (1990)). I am not suggesting that only two views are possible, but
that strong arguments against moral realism are available.
18. Martin Marty criticized the tendency of some to collapse religion and politics:
Americans today have accepted anthropological definitions of religion that are so broad
they exclude nothing. Faith, once seen as Protestant, then Christian, then Judeo-Christian,
then theistic, is now extended to include all worldviews, outlooks, notions, concerns, and
glimmerings. Now it may well be true that, pushed to the extreme, all of these are grounded somehow in a sense of the sacred. But religion includes more than the cognitive. There
must be fairly elaborate patterns of socialization, myth, metaphysics, behavioral consequence, symbol, rite, ceremony, and story to give definable form to a religion.
"Foreword," in RoacHE MCCARTHY Er AL. DISEsTABUSHMENT A SECoND TIME: GENUINE PLURALsM
FOR AMERICAN SCHoOLs at xiv (1982). For example, many who seek or would allow an active role for
religion in law and politics argue that helpful distinctions do exist between discourse which is publicly
accessible and pluralistic, on the one hand, and, on the other, discourse that is private and impositional.
Michael Perry's LoVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORAiTY IN AMERICAN POLtrCS
(1991) is an attempt to define a more open public square--open to everyone-including translations of
religious voices, although critics have wondered whether his square would ever admit conservative Christians. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Religious Language and the Public Square, 105 HARv. L. REv. 2061
(1992); David M. Smolin, Regulating Religious and Cultural Conflict in a Postmodern America: A Response to ProfessorPerry, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1067 (1992). Kent Greenawalt, who in RELUGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND PoLrrICAL CHOicE (1988) defended a place for religion in public life, confirms the existence
and virtue of a secular discourse-"the nonreligious language of shared premises and modes of reasoning." Greenawalt, supra note 6, at 1022. Even David Smolin, who argues for the authority of the JudeoChristian tradition in American legal discourse (and criticizes as misleading the notion of a secular "realm
of life and thought"), identifies a useful realm of "secular" or "mediating" language, "accessible and understandable" to those of different beliefs. See David M. Smolin, The Enforcement of Natural Law by the
State: A Response to Professor Calhoun, 16 U. DAYTON L. REv. 381, 410 (1991). Such distinctions between religious and secular discourse by apologists of religion highlight the fact that the debate over the
place of religion in law and politics is generally not between those who believe in reason (the "secularists") and those who do not (the "religious"). Rather, the debate is over the meaning of some terms in our
shared discourse, like freedom or pluralism; everyone wants genuine freedom, and everyone opposes apparent-but-actually-impositiona visions of freedom. From some secularists' perspectives, the call for more
freedom of religion spells imposition, while some religious thinkers fear that liberal ideals of freedom hide
a tendency to marginalize religious thought. With respect to neutrality, for example, Douglas Laycock
argues that the notion of formal neutrality is not actually neutral, thus he posits his "substantive neutrality"-a "conception of religious neutrality [that] includes a neutral conception of religion." See Laycock,
supra note 16, at 1002.
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based on a Christian worldview is not distinguishable, in terms of its reliance
on "control beliefs," from any other theory of pluralism.
In Section I, I describe a conception of Christian theory that challenges
the tendencies to disassociate religion from human reason and ideals like
pluralism, to characterize Christian activists as imposers of Biblical morality,
and to view liberty as a morally neutral concept. In Section I, in an effort to
identify some of the major contours of the field of controversy over religion
in law and politics, I first describe briefly the views of both Stephen Carter
(who does not collapse faith and reason but generally supports reliance on
religion in public discourse) 9 and Steven D. Smith (who identifies the religious aspects of constitutional interpretation),' and then I compare those
two views with Lawrence B. Solum's liberal notion of public reason. Though
I admire most of Solum's effort to distinguish faith from reason and morality
from liberty, I refer to J.M. Balkin's concept of ideological driftU and
James W. Skillen's work in Christian pluralism' to show that both sides in
the debate over religion in law and politics include faithful adherents to
versions of both public reason and liberty. In Sections III and IV, I focus on
two articles written by Calhoun and Ides respectively, each of whom not
only distinguishes religious from secular discourse but suggests that for law
the latter is the appropriate mode of discourse. Though I agree with much
that Calhoun and Ides say, their conceptual frameworks exemplify the unfortunate tendencies to distinguish religious ideals from the ideal of pluralism
and to identify religion with the unreasonable. I use Skillen's notion of
Christian pluralism to problematize, or in Carter's words to "complexify,"'
those tendencies. I conclude in Section V that our "overlapping consensus"
on the notion of pluralism requires, at the least, that we speak accurately of
religion when we attempt to limit its impositions in law and politics.
I. THE IDEA

OF A CHRISTIAN POLmCAL THEORY

One possible theory concerning the relation of Christianity to politics
and law is that there is no such relation. Such a theory might be based on
various conceptions of the separation of church and state, of faith as the
opposite of reason, or of two independent "worlds" in which the Christian
lives. Another theory-associated with theonomic perspectives and with
media images of the Christian Right-might be that Christians should be
active in law and politics to ensure that Biblical mandates are enforced. A
third theory, however, which is quite foreign to popular as well as much

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Carter, supra note 13.
Steven Smith, Idolatry in Constitutional Interpretation, 79 VA. L. REv. 583 (1993).
Balkin, supra note 15.
SKnLEN, supra note 13.
See Carter, supra note 13, at 587.
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Christian theological discourse, can be identified among Christian scholars
who work in the fields of law and politics but who neither consider themselves to be theologians nor search the scriptures for "model" acts or laws.
Rather, such scholars, who typically believe that faith-like, pre-theoretical
commitments are inevitable in all theorizing, approach their inquiries from a
Christian perspective.
That Christian perspective-which might be called a worldview, or a
"conscious" Kuhnian paradigm, or a set of foundational or "control" beliefs-is considered by its holders to be Biblical, but
the Bible cannot function as a black book of theories for the
Christian scholar ....With respect to many matters, especially
matters of detail .... more than one theory... will satisfy the

belief-content of a... Christian commitment [which] is not...
the source of data for... theory-weighing.... [By] and large the
Christian scholar arrives at the data... by using the same strategies as everyone else-by observing and reflecting on the world
around him.2'
In this view, the "belief-content of a Christian commitment" functions like
any other set of control beliefs, whether associated with a major world religion or not. For example, a Christian may believe that we all have responsibilities toward one another, such as caring for those in illness or poverty, and
also believe that we all should be free "to carry out or not to carry out those
responsibilities. For Christian scholars these propositions, accordingly, ought
to function as control over the sorts of theories which [they] are willing to
accept."'
Note that the "belief-content of a Christian commitment" does not contain or entail theories, which are obtained "by using the same capacities of
imagination that scholars in general use."' Nor will all control beliefs be
contained within the commitment to Christianity, since "no one is just a
Christian."" Nevertheless, proponents of this idea of Christian scholarship
assume that all theoretical thought is faith-based, whether consciously or not.
As to the distinction between a Christian political or legal theory and a religious confession of faith, the former is motivated but not exhausted by the
latter. Thus, the argument that all theory is faith-based should not imply that
Christian political or legal ideals are religious propositions accessible only to
believers; utilitarian ideals, after all, are accessible to those who do not accept utilitarian assumptions.
24.
25.
26.

NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, REASON WmuN THE BOUNDS Op RELIGION 74-75 (1976).

27.

Id. at 79 (belonging to a class in a particular society, having a certain personality, and so forth).

Id. at 73.
Id. at 74.
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Returning to the theme of the propriety of religion in law and politics,
consider the example of a Christian legislator. On the basis of certain assumptions concerning human responsibility and freedom that he or she thinks
are Biblical, this legislator opposes governmental discrimination against
homosexuals and supports governmental interference to prohibit discrimination against homosexuals. Such views on the limits and responsibilities of the
state are obviously not spelled out in the Bible. But assume that our legislator is convinced that holding such views is required by his commitment to
follow Christ, to be an agent and witness for Him. On the question of whether the legislator is imposing a religious belief, the usual oppositions between
"direct appeals to faith" and "secular reasons," and between religious impositions and pluralistic tolerance, are problematized. We might ask the legislator
whether his or her political position is based on an interpretation of a sectarian text or whether it is based on a reasonable evaluation of the data concerning the needs of a pluralistic society. However, for this legislator the question
makes little sense, because something like a sectarian text-a set of beliefs-functions in any reasonable evaluation of the data.
The three tendencies in law and religion discourse that I identified above
combine to marginalize religious conceptions of law and politics such as a
Christian theory of pluralism. The first tendency, opposing terms like faith
and morality to terms like reason and liberty, is exemplified in Ides' reflection on Bowers.' But what of the possibility that a Christian legislator
might discover in his faith the basis for a notion of moral tolerance that is
confirmed as reasonable in his experience? The second tendency, viewing the
effort to justify laws by appealing to scripture as the paradigm of religion in
law, is exemplified in Calhoun's non-imposition principle. Any other model,
such as the theoretical development of a Christian view of pluralism, is
deemed "secular" by virtue of its appeal to something-anything-that the
non-religious value. The third tendency, imagining an amoral notion of liberty to mediate between moralities, is exemplified in Solum's liberal theory of
justice. Solum recognizes (in a way that Calhoun does not seem to) that religious morality is not the opposite of "secular" morality. Religious and nonreligious moral perspectives are alike in their comprehensive conceptions of
the good; and the field of public reason, what we might call the "secular," is
created by the overlapping consensus between such perspectives. However, in
those legal controversies where no consensus is apparent, Solum's liberty
principle is presented as an alternative to making a moral decision-as if the
priority given to individual freedom in a particular case is not part of some
cornrehensive conception of the good.

28.

Ides, supra note 12.
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II. PUBLIC REASON: ATTACKED, DEFENDED, AND

DIVIDED AGAINST ITSELF

Q: What is faith?
A: Resolutely shutting your eyes to scientific fact.
Q: What is the human intellect?
A: A barrier to faith.
Q: What are the seven Christian virtues?
A: Respectability; childishness; mental timidity; dullness;
sentimentality; censoriousness; and depression of spirits.
I cannot help feeling that... these replies... fairly accurately reflect what many people take Christian orthodoxy to be,
and for this state of affairs I am inclined to blame the orthodox.2
Stephen Carter's recent attack on liberal notions of religion either as
prejudice (per Rawls) or as inappropriate in the public square (per
Ackerman) is based upon his view of religion as a facet of most human
personalities.' Agreeing that pluralist democracy requires separation of
church and state, Carter sees no reason why we should exclude from public
discourse "those whose appeals are openly and explicitly religious in nature,"
or prevent "such citizens... [from] trying to enact secular legislation, if
they can but convince other citizens of the wisdom of their positions."31
Carter gives three examples-the abortion debate, the creation-science controversy, and Supreme Court cases on religious freedom-of how the doctrine of separation of church and state seems lately to require a "separation
of church and self."3" Given that the "state inevitably makes moral judgments [and that] the considered moral judgments of citizens are often ... in-

formed by religious belief[,] one cannot exclude from the debate those whose
consciences are formed in part by religion unless one wants to restrict debate
to an unrepresentative agnostic elite."33 Carter, however, maintains in his focus on religious freedom a distinction between religious and non-religious
discourse in law. 4
A different approach is exemplified in Steven Smith's recent account of
idolatry in constitutional interpretation, which goes beyond some scholars'
identification of law with religion (i.e., law as a "civil religion") and chal-

29.
30.
31.
32.

DOROTHY SAYERs, CREED OR CHAOS? 23 (1949).
Caner, supra note 13, at 585-86.
Id. at 587.
Id. at 586.

33. Id. at 590.
34. Carter does not argue, for example, that religion is a 'Tundament" of everyone's personality-just

that of millions of citizens. Id. at 586.
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lenges law's pretense of being rational and secular. 5 Appeals to transcendent authority and leaps of faith, supposedly disavowed by popular versions
of constitutional interpretation, may actually characterize them.'
[Inasmuch] as the transcendent authority upon which these theories implicitly rely is illusory, legal interpretation can most accurately be understood as a species of "idolatry." Moreover, the
leading temple devoted to this idolatrous practice is not the socalled "civil religion" of Constitutional worship attributed to popular culture, but rather the legal academy itself.37
After exploring the elusive, nonrational quality of legal interpretation,
Smith concludes that we tend to endow "the constitutional text with qualities
that transcend those of mortal legislators, citizens, scholars, and judges who
actually write, read, and vote for the text."38 In this way we construct an

object-the idol-that satisfies our "demand for the superlative" and for
community.39 Unlike Carter's critique of the separation of church and self,
Smith's disclosure of idolatry in legal theory is not an argument for the propriety of explicitly religious arguments in law and politics. Yet the implication of Smith's analysis, if correct, is a level playing field-religious communities would benefit from an acknowledgement by legal scholars that all
of our government's foundational principles are faith-based and not the result
of mere rationality. While that is not Smith's point, since he also observes
that legal idolaters do all they can to hide their belief-system,' those whom
he convinces of their idolatry but cannot convert (because such fictions are
viewed as necessary) would be hard-pressed to exclude other believers from
the field of legal discourse.
One of the most eloquent rejoinders to those who believe that faith and
reason are difficult to distinguish, and thus that religious people should not
be handicapped in law and politics, is Lawrence Solum's article Faith and
Justice,4 ' which builds on Rawlsian notions of justice. Focusing on the propriety of religious faith as a basis for judicial decisions, Solum argues that
such decisions should be "justified by public reasons that could be accepted
by individuals from a diversity of faiths or no faith at all."' 2 Public reasons
include logic, common sense, uncontroversial facts, science, and values-like

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Smith, supra note 20, at 587-88; see supra note 17 regarding law as a civil religion.
Smith, supra note 20, at 587.
Id. at 587-88.
Id. at 629.
Id.

40. Id. at 630.
41.
42.

See Solum, supra note 7.
Id. at 1083.
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freedom and equality-from our public political culture. 3 Solum also believes legislators should ground their choices in public reason, but we need
not "forbid political advocacy on religious grounds" by others." Thus he
avoids Carter's concern that religious views might be deemed inappropriate
in public discourse regarding law. Moreover, Solum argues that our laws
should not be viewed as suspect because of their religious foundation or a
coincidence between a legislator's vote and her religion, as long as that foundation is consistent with our public political culture.45 We need not worry
about religious sources and foundations because an appropriate legal decision
must be justified by supplementary public reasons.
Solum's account of the distinction between religious and public reasons
also successfully avoids the critique that such a distinction ignores the historical religious and moral foundations of law. Solum does not even attempt to
provide any "ultimate foundation" for the premises of freedom and equality,
since they are already part of our politics.' Such a foundation would, of
course, be religious or moral,47 but that does not mean for Solum that religious and moral reasons are justifiable bases for legal decisions. Comprehensive moral perspectives, whether religious (e.g., Christian, Jewish, Islamic,
etc.) or secular (e.g., Kantian, Secular Humanist, Utilitarian, etc.), are only
justifiable foundations for law to the extent that they overlap with our public
political culture."

43. ld. at 1091.
44. Id. at 1090.
45. See Carter, supra note 13, at 587; Solum, supra note 7, at 1091.
46. Solum, supra note 7, at 1093. Solum defends his analysis as political, as historically contingent,
and as rooted in the here and now--"in the conditions that prevail in the modem North Atlantic Constitutional democracies." Id. at 1087-88. We have diverse beliefs, and since there is no method for achieving
wide social agreements about what is ultimately good or meaningful, we search for common ground to
mediate our differences. That common ground includes toleration of religious belief, free exercise of religion, no establishment of religion, and the requirement of public reason. Id. at 1089.
Carter may well agree, with respect to public officials, that the fourth principle (the requirement of
public reason) is part of our common ground. See Carter,supra note 13, at 587: "Even if one enforces a
dialogic rule that limits how the state as an entity may justify its choices, that rule should not" limit discourse among citizens. Smith, on the other hand, might view Solum as a confessing idolater, since Solum
concedes that we have to start somewhere, so let's assume that the religious and moral background to our
notions of freedom and equality constitute a foundation. Some of those who believe that religious influence in law and politics is appropriate might thrill to think that Solum certifies as "public reasons" any
appeals to our public political culture-such as the U.S. Constitution and the Declaration of Independence.
Solum, supra note 7, at 1091. Smolin makes such an appeal in his defense of Christian politics. See David
M. Smolin, The Judeo-Christian Tradition and Self-Censorship in Legal Discourse, 13 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 345, 399-400 ("Judeo-Christian morality ... arguably gives support to" the principles of the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights). Solum intends to certify, however, only the values in those
documents that can be justified without "direct reliance" on religious beliefs. Solum, supra note 7, at
1091.
47. See Solum, supra note 7, at 1093.
48. Another way of stating this is that it is the overlap of comprehensive conceptions of the good that
constitutes our public political culture. See id. at 1095. Religious conceptions may be part of the public
political culture and common sense, or, even if they are not, they may ground a public reason (e.g., belief
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Solum seems to have solved one of the real dilemmas in legal theory
today by acknowledging the moral foundations of law while excluding moral
impositions not supported by public reasons (which are by definition acceptable to almost everyone). However, I am afraid he has simply reformed the
dilemma. The "common ground" of our public political culture turns out to
be a collection of principles that in particular cases require interpretation and
that are subject to various interpretations, even today. That is, "public reason" is defined by Solum to include values in our public political culture.'
That culture is defined to include the U.S. Constitution, which is subject to
diverse interpretations as to our values or their meaning for law and politics.
Those interpretations in turn seem to destabilize the notion of public reason.
Moreover, Solum's justifications for his requirement of public reason include
the arguments (i) that it respects freedom and equality, which are also (like
other values in the Constitution) rooted in our political culture, and (ii) that
we need the stability that comes from an overlapping consensus between the
various moralities regarding principles of justice, like toleration, for example." This still leaves us with differing conceptions of what those principles
mean.

My own sense is that those who agree on the importance of Constitutional values like equality, freedom, and tolerance have not yet agreed on very
much with respect to the propriety of religion in law and politics. Surely
both sides in every free exercise or establishment clause case appeal to those
values-as do both sides in the school choice, voting rights, and abortion
controversies. Solum makes a compelling argument that judicial reliance on
religious premises offends our shared notions of freedom and equality, but
note his examples of direct reliance on religion: (i) prohibiting murder by
law solely because it is prohibited "by the revealed word of God;""1 (ii) a
public official appealing to "a passage in the New Testament" to justify a
political position; 2 (iii) the President deciding to invade another country on
the basis of a prominent preacher's interpretation of the New Testament; 3
and (iv) the Supreme Court reversing Roe v. Wades' because a majority believes God gives every human an immortal soul at the moment of conception."5 Such examples reinforce the perception that legislating scripture is
that humanity is created in God's image may ground a belief in equality that is shared by the noneligious). Thus when religious and secular scholars agree on, for example, the notion of toleration, such an
"overlapping consensus represents a convergence of rational support" from diverse belief-systems. Id. at
1096.
49. Id at 1091.
50. Id at 1090, n.27.
51. Id. at 1091.
52. Id. at 1093.
53. Id. at 1096.
54. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
55. Solum, supra note 7, at 1103.
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what Christian political and legal theory is all about. On the other hand,
these examples are merely intended by Solum to show a lack of "overlapping
consensus" regarding justification-an appeal to a Christian, Kantian, or
utilitarian political or legal theory in a judicial opinion would suffer the same
fate as a Bible verse. Each would be offensive as a justification, but the
principles or content of each could be justified on the basis of commonly
held values.
Solum seems to suggest that any appeal to a "value" such as freedom of
religion in our political culture is sufficient to justify a legal opinion. This
would imply that any judicial interpretation of freedom of religion in a particular case would meet the test of public reason. This seems to me to demonstrate the instability of the value--"freedom of religion"--and its inability
to serve as a guide in a freedom of religion case. We could then shift to the
notion of pluralism, part of our public political culture, to ensure that the
freedom given to religion does not offend the freedom of others. That, too,
seems to me to be a matter of interpretation of "pluralism," not a standard of
decision.

I am assuming that, in such a case, two conflicting interpretations of
religious freedom or pluralism are available, and thus I am agreeing with
Greenawalt that the actual grounds for decision in such a case go beyond
commonly accessible reasons.' Greenawalt suggests that the abortion controversy also presents a case where commonly accessible reasons conflict.57
Solum, on the other hand, believes that public reasons are available to support Roe v. Wade."5 However, Solum acknowledges the possibility that there

56. See KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICrIONS AND PoLcI.cAL CHoIcE 137 (1988).
57. Solum, supra note 7, at 1103.
58. Id at 1101 n.61. Solum is, in contrast to Greenawalt, "far from certain... that publicly accessible
reasons cannot be used to resolve important questions of political morality" Id. at 1101 n.60. Unfortunately, to make his point that most hard cases do not require recourse to nonpublic reasons, Solum sets up the
abortion controversy as a conflict between those who agree with Roe v. Wade and those who want it reversed because of a religious belief that God ensouls fetuses. Id. at 1103. Solum imagines a passage from
an opinion reversing Roe v. Wade on such religious grounds, then says: "Ibe fact that we do not even
consider the possibility of a religiously grounded reversal of Roe highlights the strength of our intuition
that such opinions should not be written." Id. The problem that Greenawalt highlights, however, is that
Roe could be reversed on the basis of public reasons such as liberty for the fetus as a human life; thus the
public reasons are contradictory and may require recourse to moral assumptions. By setting up the abortion debate the way he does, Solum misses Greenawalt's point.
Interestingly. Solum notes that "there may be times when allowing nonpublic reasons is necessary to
prevent a great evil." Solum, supra note 10, at 751. Solum, following Rawls' analysis, has in mind the
abolitionist movement, but the nonpublic reasons supporting abolition become, in Solum's view, a ground
for a pubic reason because of our "intuitive sense that the use of religious argument by the abolitionists
was not an offense against political morality." hId (citing RAWLS, supra note 10, at 249-51). The idea that
some religious values are not permissible to affirm public reason, however, "is problematic because favoring some references to moral or religious values over others is likely at least to seem contrived to people
who cherish the values that are excluded. This, in turn, is likely to undermine confidence in the overlapping consensus." Powers, supra note 10, at 455, referring to RAWLS, supra note 10, at 247-50.
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may be cases where the public reasons are under-determinative and uses the
abortion controversy as an arguable example. He suggests application of a
corollary to the requirement of public reason-the liberty principle-resolves
the conflict between opposing positions based on public reasons without
recourse to moral beliefs."
I view Solum's liberty principle as a moral belief. I admire it as a
thoughtful reflection on law and politics, because I think it is an appropriate
development of a moral ideal given the facts of our political culture. The
liberty principle is a model political theory, a picture of how moral ideals are
developed on the basis of reasoning and experience into a theory that can be
presented as the best orientation for a pluralistic society. Solum concedes that
the liberty principle is historically contingent and only political, not a neutral
concept or Archimedean point of departure,'" and I agree. But when Solum
appeals to the fact of pluralism, and even the fact of contemporary American
pluralistic society,6 ' he has not avoided interpretation of those facts on the
basis of deeply-held values. Those values function, like religious sources and
foundations, to give meaning and content to the notion of liberty.
On the issue of whether principles of equality and freedom provide a
basis for the evaluation of religious influences on law and politics, consider
J. M. Balkin's recent response to Frederick Schauer's essay on constitutional
positivism. Balkin re-introduces his term "ideological drift" to describe how
conceptions of free speech and racial equality change over time.' There are,
Balkin notes,
really two ways to think about the phenomenon of drift. The first
is to imagine the content of the idea as held constant and consider
the changing political consequences of the idea in changing contexts.... A second and equally important way is to imagine the
content of the idea... as changing as the context surrounding it
changes.... This second conception envisions drift as the product
of a struggle over the meaning and legacy of political and legal
ideas.'3
The latter approach sees at "stake in the debates over equality and liberty...
the tools of understanding we use to make sense of the social world around
us. ' " Thus the

59. See Solum, supra note 7, at 1102. Uberty principle "leaves the moral choice to individuals or
voluntary communities." Id
60. See id at ll04.
61. Id. at 1088, 1092-93.
62. Balkin, supra note 15, at 871.
63. Id. at 871-72.
64. Id. at 878.
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struggle over meaning is the struggle over the forms and contours
of thought, the tools of understanding which we internalize and
which constitute us as human beings who live at a particular historical moment in a particular culture.... At stake is the definition of the contours of reason and the reasonable.'
Reason, in this account, "is the field of cultural power." Any attempt to
stabilize the struggle over meaning by reference to foundational values that
are implicit in our political system simply creates another instance for a
specified field of the struggle; when stability is achieved, it is the result of a
tentative definitional victory, not of constant values.
Balkin concedes that the metaphor of struggle (or battle) is misleading to
the extent it hides the cooperative aspect of intellectual discourse:
We may find, even in the most adversarial context, a certain degree of implicit cooperation about what constitutes an argument,
what is an appropriate appeal to reason, and so forth. An agonistic
enterprise is invariably also a communal enterprise, for without a
shared basis of intellectual dispute, no argument could be convincing, no victory could be gained, no agenda could be set.67
Thus Solum, in his description of the public reason to which legislators
and judges may properly appeal, includes logic, common sense, and science,
although the contours of the latter two may be quite contestable. Yet to suggest, as Solum does, that appeals to values derived from the Constitution will
be publicly accessible is to assume away one of the major disputes regarding
law and religion. For his opening line, Solum quotes Wittgenstein's definition of religion as a way of living: "It's passionately seizing hold of this
interpretation. " ' All readers of the Constitution, however, must seize hold
65. Id. I should explain that Solum, see supra note 10, at 735-36, argues that the ideal of public reason "will change over time" as a result of public debate and discussion. I am somewhat dazzled by
Solum's remark that the "debate over the contours of the ideal will itself be shaped by the prevailing ideal
at any given point in time," L at 736, because I cannot figure out what comes first, the debate or the
ideal. Statements like "An ideal of public reason is a normative standard for the use of public reason," id
at 730, and "An ideal of public reason must by justified by public reason," id at 735, seem circular-Solum's term is "reflexive." Taken out of context, this sounds like Balkin's "at stake are the contours
of the reasonable" argument. Yet for Solum, and for Rawls, reason is "firmly" associated with common
sense, the simple rules of inference and evidence, and scientific method (when not controversial); these are
the basics, but we must include generally shared beliefs and values in order to get to political morality. I
now see how public reason is constructed, but I fail to see how it works when we disagree on the implications of our shared beliefs and values-it does not, until we give meanings to the notions of liberty and
fairness that are not justified by public reasons, which is precisely what the ideal of public reason is supposed to prevent.
66. Balkin, supra note 15, at 879.
67. Id. at 877.
68. Solum, supra note 7, at 1083, quoting LUDWIG WroENmN, CuLTURE AND VALUE 64e (P.
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of an interpretation, and they do not all seize upon the same one.
If one of those values in the First Amendment is pluralism, then how do
we classify the arguments for "genuine" pluralism made by religious legislators and judges for religious reasons? Perhaps the mere appeal to the First
Amendment is sufficient to make such arguments public; perhaps the "fact"
of pluralism is sufficient for the requirement of public reason. The question
is significant because contemporary criticism of religious appeals in law and
politics often seem to proceed on the assumption that religious activists are
intent on imposing morality and sacrificing pluralism, even though numerous
religious voices in the discussion suggest otherwise."
Jim Wallis, for example, notes that over,
the last few decades, a real alternative in American religious life
has begun to emerge [which] seeks a religious perspective that is
progressive rather than repressive; inclusive and respectful of
pluralism, instead of exclusive and sectarian.... And it insists
upon the vital connection between politics and morality....
After many long years of suffocation by the political and
religious Right, we hope that the [election of Clinton] provides
some "space" for new possibilities.' °
One might view such a perspective as sufficiently public because it appeals
to pluralism; more cynically, one might agree with Stephen Carter that "the
religious voice is required to stay out of the public square only when it is
' But even on the religious right there is
pressed in a conservative cause."71
concern for pluralism. Consider Kerby Anderson's advice to Christians to
become involved in politics:
What Christians should be arguing for is a "civil [i.e., neither
secular nor sacred] public square" that allows an open, civil debate
to take place....
This form of pluralism must be more than just window dressing. Christians and non-Christians alike must be dedicated to
maintaining a pluralism that allows vigorous interchange and debate.72
Winch trans.. 1980).
69. Gaffney made this point in Edward M. Gaffney, Politics Without Brackets on Religious Convictions: Michael Perryand Bruce Ackerman on Neutrality, 64 TULANE L. REV. 1143. 1147-48 (1990): "Regrettably.... Ackerman's unfamiliarity with the pluralism of religious discourse apparently leads him to
conclude that most theologians think univocally.... His unfamiliarity with... theological ethics leads
him to conclude that theology is not an ally with legal philosophy in the defense of personal dignity."
70. Jim Wallis, Memo to Clinton: Religion, 8 TIKKUN (No. 1) 22, 24 (1993).
71. See Stephen L. Carter, Conservatives' Faith, Liberals' Disdain, N.Y. TMES, Aug. 15, 1993, at
El5.
72. Kerby Anderson, Politicsand Religion, VANGUARD (Probe Ministries newsletter), Sept.-Oct. 1992,
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James Skillen, director of the Center for Public Justice in Washington,
D.C., is both an analyst of current political perspectives held by Christians
and the proponent of a version of pluralism that is based in his own Christian beliefs. In The Scattered Voice: Christiansat Odds in the Public Square,
Skilien catalogues and criticizes seven distinct Christian viewpoints on the
issue of religion in politics. (1) "Pro-American conservatives," including
fundamentalists and theologically liberal but politically conservative Christians, are those who assume that an older America was morally sound and
must be recovered; they appeal to the U.S. Constitution as often as the Bible,
and tend to equate the two as political authorities."3 (2) "Cautious and Critical Conservatives" likewise appeal to historical American values, but seek
"Biblical principles that transcend American experience even at its best." 74
(3) "Sophisticated neo-Conservatives," critical of the naked or secular public
square (and also of pro-American conservatives), argue for freedom in a limited democracy as the proper Christian perspective.75 (4) "Traditional and
Reflective Liberals," associated with American Catholicism and liberal Protestantism, are critical of the conservative ideal of limited government because
it "masks the forms of domination which its own assumptions reveal;"' the
need for genuine pluralism and individual freedom sets the agenda for reform. (5) "Civil-Rights Reformers," of course, focus their Christian political
activism on ending discrimination and advancing civil rights for everyone."
(6) "Pro-Justice Activists" (including Wallis) criticize the status quo, blaming
Christians as much as non-Christians, but do not share the desire to impose
Christian morality. 8 This desire is associated with (7) "Theonomic
Reconstructionists"-one of the least well-known of these "scattered voices."
In Skillen's exposition of these viewpoints, the emphasis on pluralism and
freedom in each is striking. Even the reconstructionists insist on a highly
limited state with maximum independence for citizens; they look like economic libertarians except in a narrow realm of moral law where selected
parts of the law of God should be imposed to ensure genuine "freedom."'
Skillen, and his Center for Public Justice, focus on developing a Christian theory of pluralism-as if pluralism is not a fixed notion but rather is
contestable. His critique of the seven identified voices is usually each's failure to clarify, both theoretically and politically, the nature of "religious free-

atl.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

SKI.N, supra note 13, at 33-53.
Id.at 57.
Id.at 75-95.
Id.at 106.
Id.at 119-39.
Id.at 141-61.
Id. at 173.
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dom in a nonconfessional state."' Skillen believes that Christianity provides
a foundation for a version of pluralism "that neither privatizes religion nor
sneaks in a privileged public position for Christians."'" To deal justly with
our society's diverse cultures, faiths, and institutions (such as families,
schools, and churches), Skillen calls for the state to recognize the religious
equality of all fundamental convictions, whether traceable to historical religions or not." Political and legal arguments proceed with normative references, which gives all such arguments a faith-based aspect, and since there
are no universal, self-evident, neutral views of life, we seek consensus between our legal and political arguments. No single Christian, Jewish, secular
or liberal perspective is discernible in the struggle for consensus. A point of
view grounded in any such perspective is no more sectarian, for Skillen, than
one grounded in another, unless one identifies religion too narrowly with
denominational churches.
Skillen distinguishes this notion of confessional pluralism from structural
pluralism-the latter is a recognition that government exists alongside families, schools, and churches as differentiated authoritative structures; that is,
one's faith-based principles have different implications in different areas of
life. For example, Skillen argues that a belief, even if majoritarian, that homosexuality is immoral does not justify a government ban. Sexual preference
is a non-governmental area of life that is distanced from government's concern with public health, welfare, and equality for all citizens except insofar
as the government owes equal protection and fairness to homosexuals. This
is not an argument for neutral government, but a normative, principled view
of a pluralistic state based on Skillen's Christian beliefs. 3
Though I have done justice neither to Skillen's analysis of Christian
political options nor to his extensive work in developing a theory of pluralism in this brief summary, his viewpoint is hard to classify under the distinctions in contemporary legal discourse between the religious and the secular
(or "public"), between faith and reason, and between imposition and freedom. Skillen's position is a faith-based moral argument, but is clearly intended to be an accessible, public-reason-type appeal to logic, to common sense,
and to the values in our public political culture.
The primary difference between Skillen and Solum seems to lie in the

80. Id. at 197.
81. Id.
82. My familiarity with Skillen's views in this discussion arises from personal conversations with him
his regular contributions to the newsletter from the Center for Public Justice (Public Justice Report), and
his latest book. RECHARGINo

THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT: PRINCPLED PLURALISM FOR GENUINE CIVIC

CommuNrrY (1994).
83. Skillen's views, and his distinction between confessional and structural pluralism, are somewhat
similar to those in Richard J. Mouw & Sander Griffioen, PuRALiSmS AND HoRizoNs: AN ESSAY IN
CHMIAN PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1993).
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former's willingness to acknowledge the structuring influence of deeply-held
moral views on ideas like freedom and on theories that require laws to be
justified on the basis of public reasons. In the next two sections, I argue that
Solum's failure to acknowledge the contestable nature of terms like freedom
and reason recurs in Calhoun's and Ides' respective analyses of religion in
public discourse and in legal decision-making.

Ill. PRIVATE CONVICTIONS, PUBLIC MODESTY
Calhoun's recent analysis of religion in law is a critical response to Kent
Greenawalt's thesis, expounded in Religious Convictions and Political
Choice, that those with religious convictions may, indeed must at times, rely
on them "in deciding what public laws and policies to support."" Calhoun
thinks that Christians should "forego seeking any law that would compel
compliance with a faith-based precept" except on independent secular
grounds.' Thus, where two different, rationally plausible views are possible,
Greenawalt would permit a choice based on religious convictions, while
Calhoun would only permit a religious choice if the view consistent with
religion is stronger in terms of commonly accessible "reasons." If the view
consistent with religion is weaker, that is, if its reasons are not as commonly
accessible, then the Christian faith requires forbearance.s' Significantly,
Calhoun and Greenawalt agree that Christians should not support laws which
prevent "a wrong judged purely from a religious perspective," like a prohibition against homosexuality where the commonly accessible arguments show
that prohibition unsupportable." However, Greenawalt sees this situation as
an exception and Calhoun as the rule.' Even in controversies over abortion,
environmental ethics, animal rights, welfare assistance, punishment, and military policy-Greenawalt's examples of areas where religious convictions
might be used-Calhoun would hesitate to impose his views on others except
on secular, rational grounds, 9 which I take to mean "commonly accessible"

84.

Calhoun, supra note 6, at 289 (quoting Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictionsand Lawmaking,

84 MIcH. L. REV. 352, 353 (1985)).
85. Calhoun, supra note 6, at 290-91.
86. Id. at 290-91 (citing GREENAWALT, supra note 56, at 166-67). Significantly, Calhoun does not

purport to be proposing a guideline for all religious people in the United States; rather, his non-imposition
principle is a Christian doctrine, and thus any criticism of Calhoun that his principle doesn't work for nonChristian religious people is moot. Were it not for the fact that Christianity is dominant among organized
American religions, Calhoun's article would be viewed as a sectarian tract. Indeed, Calhoun qualifies his
argument by clarifying his conservative evangelical perspective, including a view of the Bible as inerrant,
in a way which many professing Christians would not likely feel part of his audience. Nevertheless, since
much of the action in the field of Church/State relations involves conservative evangelicals, the implications of Calhoun's reflections should be taken seriously.
87.

GREENAWALT, supra note 56, at 204; Calhoun, supra note 6, at 290-91.

88. Calhoun, supra note 6, at 291 n.Il (citing GREENAWALT, supra note 56, at 90-91, 94).
89. Calhoun, supra note 6.
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grounds.
An ambiguity, however, with respect to the term "commonly accessible"
is present at an early stage in Calhoun's argument, even while that argument
is presented as an alternative to Greenawalt's seemingly more impositional
framework. When Calhoun speaks of the instance where the stronger of two
rationally plausible views would justify a vote consistent with one's religion,
his evaluation of "strength" is wholly subjective. That is, if Calhoun believes
that a wrong needs to be prevented, and he can justify his belief by reference
to a passage in an historical or "founding" political document, or to his own
sense that social harm will result from the failure to prevent the wrong, his
"reasoning" is "strong" even if few other citizens believe in his interpretation
of the document or in the existence of the social harm. This evaluative process, obviously based on Calhoun's unwillingness to be deterred by
majoritarian immorality, significantly weakens his notion of "commonly
accessible" reasons as well as the purported barrier-like feature of his nonimposition principle. Reasons, it turns out, are not limited to grounds that the
non-religious. might find compelling, and thus cease to help distinguish faith
from reason in law and politics. At least Greenawalt's religious impositions
are reserved for situations where shared principles are inconclusive.
Calhoun's conviction that Biblical norms should not be imposed on those
who do not share such beliefs finds affinity, he explains, with eighteenthcentury Protestants who fought against assessments to support religion "as a
prerequisite to public virtue." Roger Williams' opposition to religious persecution and John Leland's attack on early establishment schemes also foreshadow Calhoun's non-imposition principle, although Williams' broad notion
of "public safety and welfare", which included chastity for all and proper
hair length for men, obviously troubles Calhoun.9 ' The implication, in
Calhoun's narrative, is that Williams was not living up to the principle. As
an example of following the non-imposition principle, Calhoun imagines a
law prohibiting unmarried cohabitation, which might find Biblical support
but is not compellingly supported by "secular" arguments against disease,
unwanted pregnancies, or destruction of the institution of marriage.'
In what sense are such arguments "secular"? One understanding of such
arguments is that they flow easily from religious discourse: love of one's
neighbor and support of marriage and family are based on values that come
from somewhere, possibly one's religion. For a religious person, therefore,
the idea of "independently-compelling secular justification" presents a problem whenever values are at stake.93 Calhoun seems to have rendered activist

90.
91.
92.
93.

Md.at 295.
Id. at 299-300.
Id. at 301 & n.98.
See GREENAWALT, supra note 56, at 258 (asking religious people for such a justification might
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Christians mute--publicly value-free-until they adopt commonly accessible
values for public discourse. Such a requirement appears less formidable,
however, when Calhoun gives examples of the move he requires. There are,
for example, "secular" reasons to oppose murder, which presumably include
its detriment to our shared conceptions of civil order." Even Roger
Williams' desire to regulate hair length is only an imposition if he was out to
get Quakers-regulation for "civil order" is a non-imposition."
Again, I wonder about the "secular" nature of an argument for civil
order. Calhoun seems to be designating a field of discourse where persuasion
relies on shared values apart from religious traditions. But then Calhoun
creates an exception to the non-imposition principle, a situation when one
may "vote one's religion," if the vote will not diminish freedom." For example, suppose a law is proposed that prohibits eating meat, and a Christian,
who supports the law on secular grounds but believes on religious grounds
that eating meat is moral, votes for the freedom to eat meat; that is not an
imposition because it leaves society in a state of freedom.9' Suddenly the
notion of shared values is irrelevant; suddenly, also, independent secular
justification can be ignored by the Christian; and suddenly the pragmatic
arguments against generating "annoyance and hostility" toward Christianity
are set aside.
Here again, an ambiguity appears in Calhoun's argument due to his term
"freedom." If in the previous example, eating meat was clearly linked to the
early death of millions of citizens, during, say, their parenting years, then an
argument for the greater freedom that would result from the meat prohibition
(freedom to live longer and freedom for children to have families) could
counterbalance the freedom toward death. Social programs and directives will
probably always decrease some citizens' freedom, if only by higher taxes,
while increasing the freedom of others. I am therefore not convinced that the
notion of freedom can do the work Calhoun needs it to do-to distinguish
between when one may vote one's religion and when one must vote in accordance with secular reasons.98 If Calhoun's characterization of law as something that decreases freedom is a personal and subjective judgment, then he
loses a little more of the "secular" as a shared value system to which religious and non-religious citizens may appeal.
Anticipating the criticism that religious people will not be able to distinguish the "secular" reasons from their faith-based positions, Calhoun suggests

result in "a frustrating alienation of their whole persons from their political characters").
94. Calhoun, supra note 6. at 302 n.101.
95.

Id.

96. Id. at 291 n.12.
97. See id. at 305-06 (compelling godly behavior through law is not the same as Christian obedience;
people forced to follow Christian precepts would feel negative toward Christianity).
98. Calhoun could, of course, turn to his notion of civil order to anchor such laws in the "secular."

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol 6

that they try, but believers should not worry when their secular reasons track
their religious convictions. If "the Christian honestly can say that his faith
only confirms what he is confident he would believe apart from faith, there

can be no imposition."" Such independent grounds include, however, "a
human desire for order, peace, justice, kindness, love or any of the values

most of us agree are desirable.... ."" Finding a secular basis, therefore, is
as easy as Roger Williams' transforming Christian politics into civil order: if
a Christian's sincere desire for peace, justice, and love is sufficiently secular,
solely on the basis that those ideals are already out there, then that Christian
is imposing his faith-based views on others with respect to the meaning of
these.
On the surface, Calhoun's non-imposition principle appears to be a selfimposed limitation on Christian political influence based on respect for
shared or "secular" forms of knowledge and discourse. However, too many
situations can be identified where the principle is neither limiting nor respectful. Religious impositions are allowed when tied to secular reasons, but the
"secular" is not correspondingly tied to shared principles--the reasons can be
wholly personal, just not religious. Provided that the attempt to find a nonreligious basis is sincere, and not a cover, then impositions from the religious
community are allowed in the name of freedom, peace, justice or love-all
of which are "secular" foundations.'

However, these concepts do not offer

foundations when we argue about their meaning because we do not debate
their abstract definitions, but instead apply them in particular situations with
respect to particular laws. They cannot serve, therefore, as the standard for
distinguishing impositional religious from non-impositional secular grounds
for law.
Calhoun's argument rests on a notion of rational discourse, which is
distinct from religious discourse, as the appropriate medium for legal and
political decision-making. Without denying the efficacy of shared forms of
discourse, I agree with Greenawalt that rational discourse has its limits--that
on some decisions one must resort to one's "personal sense of life."" For
Greenawalt, "shared principles of justice, shared methods of assessing values,
and shared ways of determining facts will often prove inconclusive. The
problem is not solely that considerations on each side may be neatly balanced. Rather, common reasoning may be radically inconclusive."'' People
rely in such cases on personal intuitions or on religious perspectives, neither

99. Calhoun, supra note 6.
100. Id. at 312 (quoting Mario Cuomo, Religious Belief and Public Morality: A Catholic Governor's
Perspective, 1 NoTRE DAME J.L. EIuCS & PUB. POL'Y 13, 16-17 (1984)).
101. I keep trying to imagine a religious value that could not be sincerely related to civil order, justice,
or love.
102. GREENAWALT, supra note 56. at 109-10.
103. Il at 1022.
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of which should be privileged over the other in political dialogue.1°4 Both
the religious and the non-religious, Greenawalt argues, resort to values.
Calhoun would agree, but he views the values of the non-religious as more
appropriate for law and politics. Recall, however, that Calhoun includes the
following as non-religious values: Williams' "civil order"; Cuomo's."justice"; the belief of Blue-Law advocates (not Calhoun) that a day of rest is
good for the family; and the view of pro-life activists (like Calhoun) that
abortion is murder." Such believers have successfully "objectified" their
thinking about law."t
Calhoun's term "objectified" is telling. His non-imposition principle is
premised on a vision that legal processes and institutions need recourse to a
public realm of shared principles. Yet the meaning of those principles in
particular cases is a subjective, interpretive affair.
Calhoun does not attempt to examine critically the notion of secular
discourse, probably because he views the exercise as unnecessary. He seems
to accept (1) Cuomo's distinction between "parochial or narrowly sectarian"
reasons on the one hand, and arguments that appeal to "the values most of us
agree are desirable even apart from their specific religious base or context; ' ' 107 and (2) Zimmerman's distinction between religious reasons and
"independent, objective grounds.""tes In addition, Calhoun does not acknowledge that the values supporting his secular reasoning are faithbased. 1"s This, however, does not concern me. Rather, my concern is that
"the values most of us agree on" at each point in our nation's history are
privileged as "independent, objective grounds" for political dialogue. Such
values turn out, in particular cases, to be manipulable by sincere interpreters.
While I agree that imposing Biblical morality does not accord with most
visions of pluralism, I would also oppose the imposition of non-religious morality that is contrary to pluralism. Conversely, I am neither skeptical of a
pluralistic theory of justice rooted in religious values, like Skillen's, nor such
a theory rooted in liberal values, like Solum's, as to their propriety in law
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Calhoun supra, note 6 at 312-15 (discussing blue laws and abortion).
Id. at 317-18:
Can it be fair... to require [that Christians alone justify their lawmaking proposals on ra-

tional grounds]?
One response to this fairness objection is to argue that people without religious faith
should attempt to objectify their thinking about law to the furthest extent possible. Even if
this argument were accepted as valid, the fact that the nonreligious never made the effort
would not release Christians of their obligation to try.
Id.
107. See supra text accompanying note 96.
108. Calhoun, supra note 6. at 312 n.143, citing Diane L. Zimmerman, To Walk a Crooked Pathv Separating Law and Religion in the Secular State, 27 WM. & MARY L REv. 1095, 1102 (1986).
109. Calhoun's use of the term "faith-based" for religious discourse is a reference to organized religions or "Faiths" in everyday parlance. I clarified this point in my discussions with Professor Calhoun.
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and politics.
If Calhoun manages to ignore his religious values in deciding how to
vote, then in my view he will decide on the basis of someone else's faithbased values. That decision need not be consistent, in his view, with how
most others vote on the basis of the same values. Such "impositions" are
inevitable, and I do not question the reasonableness of Calhoun's vote. However, Calhoun's analysis, especially his examples of legislating scripture,
suggests that religious values that are relevant to law and politics do not
include freedom and equality. Therefore, religious values seem to be an
unlikely basis for a theory of pluralism. Calhoun's non-imposition principle
thus has on the surface some common-sense appeal: it confirms a separation
between church and state, it promotes a communitarian vision of politics, and
it offers the hope that law is fair and objective, not an ideological power
structure."10 On close reading, however, the image of an order of secular
principles to which we may appeal in legal discourse, including discourse
concerning religion in law and politics, is only a mirage. The "things we
generally agree on" are ambiguous ideals, requiring recourse to highly personalized notions whenever a particular law is to be evaluated by Calhoun as
worthy of support. Given Calhoun's themes of non-imposition and his emphasis on maximum freedom, he comes close to an argument for Christian
pluralism like Skillen's, but his belief in the exclusive propriety of secular
ideals gets in the way. If pluralism has a fixed non-religious meaning, then
of course Christian pluralism is an imposition, perhaps even a contradiction
in terms.
Before concluding that discursive frameworks like Calhoun's function to
hide both the possibility of a religious political theory with pluralistic ideals
and the instability of secular ideals, I explore Allan Ides' model of reason in
law as a popular and almost compelling justification for Calhoun's notion of
objectified, secular legal discourse.
IV. THE [UN-]REASONABLENESS OF MORAL CERTrrUDE

Allan Ides' recent analysis of Bowers v. Hardwick,"' which upheld the
constitutionality of a Georgia sodomy statute, was given as a paper in a
symposium on judging. The analysis begins by highlighting Justice Powell's
later remark that he was probably mistaken in joining the Bowers majority." The majority opinion was an attempt to avoid judge-made constitutional law, defined in Bowers
as law rooted in neither "the language [nor]
design of the Constitution."' " The Court concluded "that morality, standing
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111.
112.
113.

Calhoun, supra note 6, at 322.
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Ides, supra note 12, at 93.
Id. at 95 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194).
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alone, provided a sufficient rational basis to justify" the Georgia law.""
Four Justices dissented, finding the fundamental right of privacy at stake, and
criticized the majority's reliance on morality to justify the statute.'
Ides identifies two alternatives that were available to the Court in its
effort to avoid wandering too far from the Constitution. First, the Court
could have concluded that Hardwick lacked standing because he was speculating about and challenging future conduct; the original criminal charges
against him had been dismissed, and the last reported prosecution under the
statute was in 1939."6 Thus the Bowers decision was perhaps abstract, unnecessarily controversial, and untimely in light of the trend toward abolition
of such laws."' On the other hand, the courts of appeal were in conflict
over the issue, and this or "something [else] compelling about the substantive
merits" drove the Justices into the fray." 8
Once in the fray, Ides suggests, a substantive alternative was also available. Instead of assuming that the primary issue was whether a fundamental
right was at stake, and thereafter focusing on the illegitimacy of non-interpretive review as did the majority, or on unenumerated rights as did the dissent,
the Court could have defined the word "liberty" in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to "cover the widest possible range of human actions" because
the Constitution does not limit the term." 9 Thus "laws that inhibit the freedom to act must satisfy the judicially supervised reasonableness test of due
process."' Ides concedes that the rational basis test often results in deference, 2' but he seeks to reinvigorate the notion as involving more than
majoritarian preference, more than "abstract desire," and, significantly, more
than morality: "[If] the underlying preference of the majority is moralitydriven, it does not necessarily follow that the law is reasonable. One abstraction-morality-has merely been substituted for another-desire."' While
the majority in Bowers found that a moral choice satisfied due process, Ides
would not allow "the assertion of moral values to substitute for a more precise justification of the law.... The assertion... does no more than reformulate the description of majoritarian desire."'"
An alternative perspective is explored in Ruth Colker's assessment of
Bowers." In Colker's view, the problem with the majority opinion is its

114. Id. (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196).
115. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 208-13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
116. Ides, supra note 12, at 96-97.
117. Id. at 98.
118. Id. at 98-99.
119. Id. at 99-100.
120. Id. at 101.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 102.
123. Id. at 102-03.
124. Ruth Colker, Disembodiment: Abortion and Gay Rights, in RADICAL PH.OOmy OF LAW 234-35
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reliance on an intolerant religious perspective. Reliance on a religious perspective that respects the lives of all people thus would not present a constitutional problem."z The problem with the dissent's position, that codifying
a theological perspective is constitutionally invalid, "is that whatever position
the state of Georgia takes with respect to sodomy will conflict with some
religious viewpoint on sodomy ....Repeal of the statute would codify a...
liberal religious perspective ....The dissent seems to assume that there is
only one religious perspective on sodomy-an anti-sodomy perspective."' "
Ides does not discuss such a view because the anti-sodomy law in Bowers inhibited freedom. For Ides, both religious arguments for such a law and
religious arguments against such a law are irrelevant. That is, finding no
rational basis for the law, we do not need an additional moral justification to
invalidate the law. Yet Colker's remarks raise the question of whether religious conceptions of pluralism would provide a "reasonable" basis for judicial decisions.
In Ides' analysis, morality is often a motivation for legislation but hardly
a reason, because reason involves "something more concrete."'' For example, a state prohibition against alcoholic beverages is not justified by a
majoritarian perception of drinking as immoral, but could be justified for
reasons of traffic safety, illness, or poverty. "The morality is premised upon
experience, not blind faith. A concrete base of reason has been established,
and the law must be upheld if it plausibly advances the above-described
legitimate ends."'" According to Ides, faith does not "provide an adequate
basis for regulating the life of another through the iron fist of the state."'"
I am sympathetic with the idea of re-invigorating substantive due process
analysis. In the arena of land-use planning, for example, I have argued that a
regulation limiting density in order to preserve water quality should be based
on evidence that it will work, not on an irrational belief, even if held by the
majority, that density limits always preserve water quality.?" Yet the context of Bowers, involving the imposition of religious moral values, seems to
invite reflection by Ides well beyond the constitutional doctrine of substantive due process. Suddenly we are in the field of moral epistemology, where
a distinction is proposed between reasonable morality based on experience
and faith-based morality; the latter is then condemned as an inadequate basis
for wielding state power. Ides explains that this distinction, and its implica-

(David S.Caudill & S.Gold eds., forthcoming 1994).
125. Id. at 247.
126. l at 248.
127. Ides, supra note 12, at 103.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 104.
130. See David S. Caudill etal., The Policies of Legal Doctrine: A Case Study of Texas Land.Use
Planning Under the Shadow of Lucas, 5 HOMSWTA PROP. L. 11 (1992).
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tion for law, is reflected in the "contract of the Religion Clause of the First
Amendment: I will not ,use the authority of the state to impose my faithgenerated beliefs upon you; nor will you do so to me......
Referring to "an article of public liberal faith holding that it is wrong for
the state to impose anybody's morality on anyone else," Stephen Carter
remarks, "Nobody, of course, actually believes this; it is not possible to
imagine a law of any kind that constitutes anything but a moral judgment,
backed with the power of the state."' A similar assessment is found in
Frederick Schauer's discussion of constitutional positivism:
Insofar as judges must determine what counts as a deprivation of
life, liberty, or property, or what deprivations of life, liberty, and
property require due process of law, or what actions of the state
deny the equal protection of the laws, ... the contingent make-up
of the American constitutional text, to say nothing of the legal
culture surrounding it, is such as to make an amoral conception of
interpreting and applying the [U.S.] Constitution... virtually impossible (and the pretense of it therefore disingenuous).'33
Faced with such remarks, Ides would explain that his conception of law
is not amoral; he is simply arguing for reason-based, rather than faith-based,
morality. Ides may even acknowledge that moral judgments, such as the
beliefs that liberty, tolerance, and pluralism are good things, underlie the law,

131.' Ides, supra note 12, at 105. I view Ides' distinction between reason-based and faith-based morality
as part of a belief-system similar to that of process jurisprudence as described in Neil Duxbury, Faith in
Reason: The Process Tradition in America Jurisprudence, 15 CARDOzo L. REv. 601 (1993). 'The tradition must be understood primarily as the embodiment of an attitude concerning the importance of rationality within a democracy. Process jurisprudence is ... ,in essence, an attempt by lawyers to turn into theory a faith which they hold in common with other American intellectuals." IL at 703. Law, that is, 'from
the process perspective, must always be understood in light of the faith: as an institutionally autonomous
activity founded in reason." Id. at 705. Interestingly, some scholars who share Ides' suspicion of religion
in law do not share his faith in reason. See Marshall, supra note 5 (critique of religion in the public square
due to its tendency toward intolerance and persecution):
It has been contended that because religious principles are based on faith rather than reason,
they ...cannot serve as the basis for political decision-making. According to this view,
religion is an epistemologically inferior belief-system from which to construct norms of
public behavior and morality.
For a number of reasons, this argument is not persuasive. First, it is descriptively inaccurate. Just as not all non-religious postulates and mores depend on reason, not all religious
principles derive from faith. Second, the... belief that reason inspires moral or political
truths is just that-a belief.... Third, ...the conclusion that mores produced by rational
discourse are superior to those derived by faith seems arbitrary at best.... Finally, the
epistemological attack on religion suggests a hierarchy of beliefs that is inconsistent with
First Amendment Speech Clause jurisprudence, which posits that all ideas are equal.
132.
133.

l at 846-47.
Carter, supra note 13, at 588.
Frederick Schauer, Constitutional Positivism, 25 CoNN. L. REv. 797, 802 (1993).
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but then explain that substantive due process analysis begins with those
"morals" firmly in place. When new laws are proposed that inhibit freedom
and therefore smack of morality, we require that they be reasonable so that,
based on our experience, an already legitimate end will be advanced. Thus in
the example of alcoholic beverage prohibition, the experience-based "reasons" presuppose the moral judgment that human life should be protected (by
traffic laws) and enhanced (by preventing illness and poverty). This argument, however, does not help show that faith is an inadequate basis for law,
since presupposing "morals" looks a lot like faith. However, it does explain
Ides' distinction between reasonable morality-which clearly advances a
previously established belief-and faith-based morality-which a majority
may want but which does not seem to advance previously established beliefs.
Ides does not, however, retreat into substantive due process, but rather
asserts that the moral judgments underlying law can be established by reason
and not just by faith. It seems to Ides "that the essence of civil society is
reason; the antithesis is laws premised solely upon abstract faith or belief.""" Perhaps the term "abstract" is key here, as if Ides distinguishes
between reasonable and unreasonable belief as he did between reasonable
and unreasonable morality. But faith is too often the opposite of reason in
Ides' narrative. Notably, Ides does not trivialize faith as an important feature
of private life; yet for law and government, we need more solid ground.
Like Calhoun, Ides ends his analysis by anticipating criticism. He concedes that he seems to elevate reason over morality, but he opposes only
"state-imposed morality that is not based on reason."'" Reason here is contrasted to "faith-generated beliefs," as if legal discourse should be grounded
in reasonable belief." Ides seems to be saying that one's belief must be
transformed into a persuasive mode, such that if one can convince another to
believe as one does, then the belief becomes "reason." Ides, however, anticipates such a reduction of reason to rhetoric-I have merely described an
abuse of reason, not its identity with faith."
For Ides, reason is a technique for gaining knowledge of the world-we
accumulate and compare and explain our experiences by reason." 8 By contrast, faith is not based on experience, or proof, and appears to be the opposite of knowledge. When Ides says that to "premise laws upon reason
permits all beliefs to be accorded similar treatment,"' 39 he seems to have in
mind a realm of public reasons like Solum's or secular discourse like
Calhoun's-the believer must operate on the level playing field of reason.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
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Ides' final example of the difference between faith and reason involves a
person on a 10-story building who contemplates jumping but knows he will
certainly die. If, however, the person believes angels will stop his fall, that
belief is not based on "knowledge learned through experience," but on faith.
If, meanwhile, a safety net has been placed below him, he may jump hoping
that the net will work, which combines knowledge of safety nets with faith
that this time the net will work. 1" The "safety net" story in the example is

intended to show how knowledge and faith intersect, but it also shows an
actor with a preponderance of knowledge--the side to which the law should
lean when both faith and knowledge are in play.
Surely knowledge, however, is not so neatly distinguishable from faith.
When Ides acknowledges that our society is "composed of many different
beliefs and a wide array of sometimes conflicting moral principles," 4 does
he really mean to suggest that all those beliefs and principles do not constitute knowledge? If one attends school or reads books, and concludes that
there are or are not morals, or that God does or does not exist, one has
knowledge.42 One might even feel that such knowledge is confirmed in
one's experience, including religious experience. When Ides says that for our
society "reason is the only legitimate foundation,"'43 does he really think
that the correct beliefs and principles will be certified by our universal experience and thus provide a foundation that is not in some fundamental sense
faith-based? I don't think so, but in Ides' short paper (which, he concedes, is
necessarily subject to qualification and criticism), the terms reason, knowledge, and experience keep linking together in opposition to the terms faith,
belief, and morality. The resulting impression is a pragmatic justification for
Calhoun's non-imposition principle; even if the Bible did not prevent Christians from voting their religion, common sense should, since religious morality is the lowest form of human thought. It's like jumping off a building with
the hope that an angel will catch you, even though angels never do."
Though an individual might feel that religious beliefs are consistent with
experience, Ides seems to have in mind a scientific ideal, as if the questions
of constitutional law can be empirically addressed. I think a better example
of morality in constitutional decision-making is that we are all above a sev-

140. Id. at 106.
141. Id.
142. I am aware of the old but ongoing philosophical debates over the status of religious language or
knowledge, and that some philosophers who compare religious statements with scientific (or empirical, or
factual) statements often conclude that religious statements do not represent knowledge. See generally
RELtGIOUS LANGUAGE AND THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE (R.E. Santeni ed., 1968) (including essays on
both sides of the issue). Since political and legal theories fall somewhere between religious and scientific
"statements," the technical details of that debate are only distantly relevant to my definition of knowledge,
and in any event that debate is not settled.
143. Ides, supra note 12, at 105.
144. Calhoun, of course, would not agree with this characterization of religious morality.
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enth-floor cloud layer, on top of the ten-story building, guessing about what
would happen if we jump, arguing about the existence of safety-nets, and
never knowing what happened to those who jumped. If we all start to believe
in safety-nets, that will influence our behavior. Similarly in Ides' example,
once we agree that traffic safety is a legitimate end, we'll prohibit drunkdriving. In the debate over religion in law and politics, however, and particularly with respect to the meaning of terms like freedom and pluralism, the
legitimate ends are at issue.
V. CONCLUSION

Pierre Schlag argues that the major modes of legal thought-Langdellian
and rule-of-law formalism, critical legal studies, neo-pragmatism, and cultural
conservatism-have in common a failure to reflect critically on the "subject"
of law."45 The problem is not only that a relatively autonomous subject is
presumed and usually not acknowledged, but that the discourses of contemporary jurisprudence are structured so as to avoid confronting that
presumption.146
A similar presumption, identified in this article, in much of the discourse
of law and religion concerns the use of terms like freedom and pluralism as
if they are the opposite of religion, and as if they constitute a ground or anchor for analyses limiting the imposition of religion in law and politics.
Those who seek to justify an active role for religious morality in law and
politics, however, often do not view their work as involving a reduction of
freedom and pluralism; rather, freedom and pluralism are sometimes the religious morality at stake. That is, the meaning of freedom and pluralism is not
a fixed standard from which the arguments over religion in law and politics
can proceed. Instead, the meaning of such terms is one of the major issues in
the debate. To suggest otherwise is merely a strategy, perhaps unwitting, to
avoid that issue.
My suggestion for enriching the discourse concerning religion in law and
politics is simply that the instance or counter-example of religiously-moral
pluralism should be included as a realistic example of the sort of imposition
at issue nowadays. My suggestion may sound paradoxical, since the term
"pluralism" is conventionally employed as the opposite of the term "imposition." That convention, however, is misleading; the real paradox is that we
often discuss religious perspectives as if the religious lack a vision of freedom and pluralism in law and politics. We should be arguing about the best
version of freedom and pluralism, not about the best non-religious meaning
of those terms.
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